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JURISDICTION-CUSTODY CASES
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-CHANGED CONDITIONS
The problem of jurisdiction to award custody of a minor child
involves a number of complex considerations. This is largely because
modem day courts still attempt, in many cases, to hang on to out-
dated conflict principles.' Actually, the custody problem involves
more than jurisdiction by itself. It also requires a discussion of
interstate recognition, i.e. full faith and credit and choice of law.
2
"Choice of law", however, is not so important since "applicable internal
laws of the several states of the United States do not differ enough to
create problems of choice of law."3
This paper, then, will deal specifically with these two questions:
(1) What are the bases of jurisdiction to render a valid decree
awarding custody of a minor child?
(2) To what extent will custody awards receive interstate recogni-
tion?
PA T I-BASES OF JURISICTION IN CILD CUSTODY SuITs
Several authorities can be found for the proposition that there are
three bases for jurisdiction in child custody suits.4 These three bases
are generally stated as (1) domicile, i.e. "the question of custody is
one of status and therefore determined by the courts of the state
where the child is domiciled"; (2) presence, i.e. "in personam jurisdic-
tion over the child's parents"; and (3) welfare of the child, i.e. "the
child must be physically present within the state because the basic
problem before the court is to determine the best interest of the
child". This author would minimize, if not eliminate, the value of
"presence" as a separate basis of jurisdiction.6 Nevertheless, all three
"bases" will be treated in order to present a full background on the
law today.
A. Domicile.7 Domicile is the traditional conflict of laws doctrine.
The technical concept of domicile generally restricted jurisdiction to
1 See generally, Bronson, Custody on Appeal, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob.
737 (1944).
2 See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 Law
and Contemp. Prob. 819 (1944).
3 Id. at 819.
4 See 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 303 (b); also see Swope v. Swope, 125
N.E.2d 336, 337; Wallace v. Wallace, 320 P.2d 1020 at 1024, 63 N.M. 414
(1958); Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
G Sampsell v. Superior Court, supra note 4.
6 This approach ends up at substantially the same position taken by a number
of authorities, i.e. two bases of jurisdiction. Cf. 29 Ky. L.J. 101 (1934).
7 Stansbury, op. cit. supra note 2 at 820. He cites the rule of the Restatement
(§ 117); Beale on Conflicts (717) and Goodrich on Conflicts (2d ed. at 358); as
being in accord but notes that the United States courts do not agree.
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the state where the father of the child was domiciled.8 Later rules
have altered this somewhat.9 The Restatement takes this position
that custody is a matter of "status" to be determined at the place of
the domicile of the child.10 As Goodrich puts it:
It would seem, though it is not an open and shut proposition, that
the award of the custody of children in a divorce suit is an adjudication
affecting status and so properly made only where the child is domiciled
and where the parent to whom the child is awarded is domiciled... 11
Unfortunately, the concept of domicile which has occupied the
courts for so long is an artificial 12 and often non-solving term.
Because a person may have several residences, 13 the technical state
of domicile may have no relation in fact with the child's interest.14 Is
there any reason why domicile should be a basis of jurisdiction?15
. ..domestic relations concern persons . . .they cannot be localized in
any state in the sense in which that is possible as to a tangible thing.16
B. Presence.17 The courts talk about presence of the parents of
the child as a basis of jurisdiction 8 and maybe some old cases go on
presence alone, but today presence has been refined by "welfare of
the child" (to be discussed in the next section). Consequently, it is
probably not so important to talk about "presence" as such except for
its historical importance.
The usual case cited for this basis of jurisdiction is Anderson v.
Anderson.19 The mother got a judgment on a writ of habeas corpus
awarding custody to her. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia affirmed saying "that the children may not have been within
the jurisdiction of the court . . . is immaterial, since the parties
litigant were father and mother ... and the court had full jurisdiction
over them ..."20
Another case which is often cited for this approach is Wa~lace v.
8 73 Yale L.J. 134, n. 5 (1963).
9 See I Beale on Conflict of Laws 215 (1935).1o See Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 30, 32, 117, 144 (1934).
"1 Goodrich, Custody of Children in Dovorce Suits, 7 Corn. L.Q. 1, 2-3(1921).
12 Stansbury, op. cit. supra note 2, at 820.
13 Ibid.
14 Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 327 (2d ed. 1951).
15 G. C. Haggard, Jr. maintains that the views that domicile is a sufficient
and exclusive basis of jurisdiction have been "repudiated, if indeed they were
ever fully accepted." 45 Va. L. Rev. 379, n. 13 (1959).
16 Stumberg, op. cit. supra at 299.
17 "This theory is based on the premise that custody is primarily a question of
parental rights." Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958).
18 See note 4 supra.
1974 W.Va. 124, 81 S.E. 706 (1914).
20The court cited Webb v. Bitter, 60 W.Va. 193, 54 S.E. 484 (1906).
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Wallace,2 where the court held that there was valid jurisdiction to
award custody since the district court had in personam jurisdiction
over the husband and wife.22
Because of the modem trend toward consideration of the "welfare
of the child", it is doubtful that a court today would base a decision
on presence of the parents alone.
C. Welfare of the Child.2 3 The modem trend, as alluded to in
the preceding section, is toward basing jurisdiction on the residence
of the child 24 on the theory that a state is "parens patriae" of any child
residing within its borders"2 and thus responsible for the welfare and
best interests of such a child.26 To put it another way: every state has
an interest in the welfare of children within its confines.27
Actually, this "best interest" view was stated as early as 1881 in
Chapsky v. Wood,29 and gradually has come to enjoy the prominence
it now receives.3 0 In fact, some courts31 extend this view even to the
point of ignoring the procedural incidents of trial, refusing to allow
technical considerations to impede their determination of the best
interests of the child.
A leading case on this "best interests" view is that of Finlay v.
Finlay,32 where the New York Court of Appeals said:
The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody of infants found
within its territory does not depend on the domicile of its parents. It
21 Supra note 17.
22 However, both children were present on the facts of this case. See also,
Smith v. Smith, 83 S.E.2d 923 (1954) where the court held that it had continuingjurisdiction over the absent children because of the prior divorce suit; and see
Stephens v. Stephens, 53 Idaho 427, 24 P.2d 52 (1983) and Burgo v. Burgo, 149
F. Supp. 932 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"3 "While ordinarily the relation . . . is governed by the law of the domicile
of the parent having custody, any state in which a minor child is found has juris-
diction to determine questions of custody and control in the interest of the child."
14 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 14 (d). See 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 12 (a) on
the welfare of the child generally.
24See Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Chic.
L. Rev. 42, 55 (1940).
25 See Matthews, What is the Basis of Jurisdiction to Determine Which Parent
Shall Have the Custody of Minor Children Following Divorce? 29 Ky. L. J. 101,
103 (1934).
26 In re Bort, 25 Kan. 215, 37 Am. Rep. 255 (1881) is a leading case on this
proposition.
27 The general standard for this basis of jurisdiction is stated in Kovacs v.
Brewer 356 U.S. 604, 613-614 (1958).
29 25 Kan. 650 (1881).
30 See Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. Chic. L. Rev. 672-677
(1941). This article also contains a thorough discussion of Chapsky v. Wood.
31 See for example: Stokowsld v. Lumet, 19 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1959) where the
court said . . . even though the father's petition may fail to establish any basis
for court action, the issue as to what should be done in the interest of (the
children's) health and welfare is before the court, and must be determined. The
proceedings are not technical." Id. at 619.32 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). See also Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn.
211, 201 S.V. 779 (1917).
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has its origin in th eprotection that is due to the incompetent or helpless
... For this, the residence of the child suffices, though the domicile be
elsewhere. Cardozo, J.33
Summary
It is doubtful that any court today would deny that the considera-
tion of the welfare of the child is paramount in a custody case. Very
often the "technical concepts of jurisdiction... are far removed from
the child's welfare".34 Under the domicile view, where the domicile
is not the "home-in-fact", ". . it frequently happens that the child's
technical domicile has little or no practical concern with the child's
fate".3 5 The technical structure of the Restatement which supports
domicile is undercut by Sec. 148, which gives jurisdiction to a state
where the child resides if the custodian is unfit36 (however, a decree
under such circumstances is not entitled to extra-territorial effect).37
The three views thus far considered seem to be based on the
questionable assumption that jurisdiction must belong to one given
court at one given time.
From a standpoint of expediency and of achieving socially desirable
ends, there seems to be only one argument in favor of confining juris-
diction to a single state; that it will produce stability and discourage
the crossing of state lines to avoid the effect of unpalatable custody
decrees.3 8
Certainly the welfare of the child is not best served by this view.3 9
In the case of Sampsell v. Superior Court,40 the court noted the fact
that since custody decrees are not final in the "rendering states", there
seems to be no reason to attempt to arrive at a basis of jurisdiction
that will be final and accepted in all states. It should be a sufficient
basis of jurisdiction that the state "has a substantial interest in the
welfare of the child or in the preservation of the family unit of which
he is a part ..."I This view would permit concurrent jurisdiction
as long as the paramount consideration is the best interests of the
child.42
33 Id. 148 N.E. at 625.34 Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 24, at 62.
35 Wallace v. Wallace, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1024. The court cites Stans-
bury, op. cit. supra note 2.
36 Op. cit. supra note 8.37 Matthews, op. cit. supra note 25 notes that Sec. 32 of the Restatement
makes this questionable. See his comment, p. 105.
38 Stansbury, op. cit. supra note 2, at 830.
39 Op. cit. supra note 4.4o Sampsell v. Superior Court, supra note 4, at 750.
41 Stansbury, op. cit. supra note 2, at 831.
4 The court in Wallace v. Wallace, supra note 17, said that there may be
alternative bases of jurisdiction as well as concurrent jurisdiction as long as a court
has "sufficient social interest" in the Welfare of the child, citing 287 Ky. 804, 155
S.W.2d 220 (1941).
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PART II-INTERSTATE RECOGNITON OF CUSTODY DECRES 48
The second half of this paper will deal with the extent to which
custody decrees will receive interstate recognition or "full faith and
credit."44 Many of the cases on this point seem to follow the Restate-
ment rule45 which provides that a foreign decree creating "the status
of custodianship" is to receive full faith and credit if the custody has
been awarded by a court in the state of domicile of the child.46 This
statement is not so accurate in the face of case law.4 7 Courts have
long since exercised their "free discretion in the paramount interest
of the child's welfare."4s In a foreign custody decree case the court
must balance the interests of (a) full faith and credit; (b) interstate
comity; and (c) finality of litigation. This is further complicated by
(1) uncertainty as to the finality and modifiability of the prior custody
decree in the granting state; (2) the technical issues of jurisdiction
and conflict of laws; and (3) by an overriding concern for the welfare
of the child.49
A. The Doctrine of Changed Circumstances50
The fact that the custody decree was granted in a foreign state
will not usually prevent a court so disposed from modifying the decree
if there has been a change of circumstances since the prior decree.51
Because of the subjective nature of the "best interests" doctrine, trial
judges are possessed with a wide scope of discretion as to whether to
modify the prior decree or not.52 In order to limit this discretion,
appellate courts have developed the doctrine of changed circum-
43 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State."
44 See Ehrenzveig, Conflict of Laws, § 87 (1959).
45 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 144, comment a and Restatement
(Second), Conflict of Laws, § 20 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
Old. §§ 145, 146, 147. In such a case the award cannot be re-examined but
can be altered because of conditions arising after the prior award. See § 147,
comment a. In Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 144 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1957), the original view seems to have been abandoned. See § 144 a, comment c.
47 Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 44.
48 Id. at 282. See also Stansbury, op. cit. supra note 2, at 828.
40 See generally, Ford v. Ford; Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody
Decrees, 73 Yale L.J. 134 ff. (1963).50 A good statement of this doctrine can be found in Gantner v. Gantner, 246
P.2d 923, 927 (1952). "The rule is stated to be that to justify a modification there
must be a change of circumstances arising after the original decree was entered,
or at least a showing that the facts were unknown to the party urging them at
the time of the prior order, and could not with due diligence have been
ascertained."
51 See generally, The Changed Circumstances Rule in Child Custody Modifi-
cation Proceedings, 47 N.W. L. Rev. 543, 552-53.
52 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 Mich. L.
Rev. 345, 352 (1953). The use of the test of changed conditions is "rarely more
than a manner of speech supporting a preconceived result."
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stances.5 3 Depending on the attitude of the court, however, this
limitation may be largely theoretical.54
As a finding of changed conditions is one easily made when a court
is so inclined, and plausible grounds therefor can quite generally be
found, it follows that the recognition extraterritorially which custody
orders will receive or can commend is liable to be more theoretical than
of great practical consequence.55
Nevertheless, the doctrine of changed circumstances as a limit on
the conclusiveness of former decrees has received universal recognition
by the courts.56
B. The Doctrine of Complete Judicial Discretion57
Some courts have abandoned any pretenses of finding changed
conditions and have maintained that there should be complete judicial
discretion limited only by considerations of the welfare of the child 3
Some courts have noted an important exception to this rule of full
discretion in cases where the other parent, dissatisfied with the decree,
takes the child to another state to seek redetermination of the issue.5 9
In such cases a deviation from the rule is obviously necessary to
protect the interests of the child and of justice.60
C. The Requirement of Presence of Parents and/or Child
Several notable decisions allowing modification of prior custody
decrees have turned not on changed conditions or full discretion, but
on the requirement that both parents and (in most cases) the child
be before the modifying court.61 In May v. Anderson,62 the Supreme
53 Kubie, Provisions for Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal
Instrument, 73 Yale L.J. 1197, 1206 (1953).54 Trial courts can almost always find changed conditions. See Bernstein v.
Bernstein, 183 P.2d 43 (1947) where the court notes that the age of the child is
a changed condition.
55 Morrill v. Morrill, 77 AUt. 1, 6 (1910).56 Op. cit. supra note 51.
57 The Supreme Court in Kovacs v. Brewer 356 U.S. 604, 608 (1958), states:
"There is some indication that in New York a local custody decree may be modi-
fied whenever the best interest of the child demands, whether there have been
changed circumstances or not." Citing authorities. See also Boardman v. Board-
manman 135 Conn. 124, 62A.2d 521 (1948) (dictum).
5s Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 44, at 283.
59 Id. and note 30. See also Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 52, at 353, where
the author states that there can be no doubt that full freedom in the examination
of foreign custody decrees is still the rule in Kansas, relying on In re Bort, op. cit.
supra note 26 and Wear v. Wear, 285 P. 606, 616 (1930). The Kansas view is
approved in Mayes v. Mayes,, 171 Kan. 495, 233 P.2d 711 (1951).60 Id.
61 See May v. Anderson 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (issue and holding are at
528-29); Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948); White v.
White, 138 Conn. 1, 81 A.2d 450 (discussed in 26 Conn. B.J. 48, 52 (1952);
Beckman v. Beckman, 359 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566, 569; Dahlke v. Dahlke
97 So. 2d 16 (1957) (personal jurisdiction required for full faith and credit).
62 May v. Anderson, supra note 61.
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Court held that a parent may not be deprived of his (or her) right
to custody unless the court has personal jurisdiction over such parent.63
This same view has been taken by the Connecticut court in Boardman
v. BoardmanA and by other courts although the position has been
severely criticized.65
D. The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit
The Supreme Court has failed to give a solution to the full faith
and credit issue in each of the four cases before the court to date.
In the 1947 case of New York ex rel Halvey v. Halvey,66 the court
affirmed a New York order modifying a Florida custody award on
the narrow ground that Florida law would permit modification and
"what Florida could do..., New York could do also".67 The Court
expressly reserved opinion on the issue of full faith and credit.68 In
the 1953 case of May v. Anderson,6 the court confused the impact of
its decision by an extended consideration of parental rights with the
result that it is not clear whether the decision turns on full faith and
credit or on due process.70 In the 1958 case of Kovacs v. Brewer,7'
the court again avoided the constitutional issue and remanded the
case for clarification. 72 Finally, in 1962, in the case of Ford v. Ford,72
the court unanimously reversed both South Carolina lower courts on
their interpretation of the finality of "dismissed-agreed" orders under
Virginia law and again avoided the constitutional issue.74 Just what
interpretation of Virginia decisions.
disposition the court would make of the real issue remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Foreign custody decrees should always be modifiable as the wel-
fare of the child concerned requires. The limitation of requiring
changed conditions is probably no more than a fiction. The better
approach is to allow the reviewing court fall discretion to review the
circumstances which have arisen since the prior decree strictly confined
63 Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 44, § 86, at 276.
64 Boardman v. Boardman, op. cit. supra note 61.65 See 45 Va. L. Rev. 879 (1959) op. cit. supra note 15, at 386. See notes
29 and 80 and note discussion of "instability" at 390-891.
66830 U.S. 610, 67 S. Ct. 903 (1947).
G7 Id. at 614.
6S Id. And see generally: 45 Va. L. Rev. 879, 892-3 (1959) for criticism of
Halvey decision.
69 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
70 Id. at 534; and see 45 Va. L. Rev. 379 (1959) op. cit. supra note 68.
71856 U.S. 604 (1958).
72 Id. at 607 (postponement of constitutional issue). See p. 609 for Frank-
furter's -iew.
771 U.S. 187 (1962).741. at 190-194. Note that the Ford decision is questionable because of its
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to a consideration of the best interests of the child involved.7 The
one exception to this would be in cases where the complaining
parent is not acting in good faith in seeking judicial disposition.76
The firm application of full faith and credit might be persuasive if
child custody proceedings were uniformly of high standards and
based on thorough investigation; however, this is notoriously not the
case.77 The trend in the law78 will probably be to eventually abandon
7 8 This is the view taken by Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 44, at 277. Cf.
Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, '7 Corn. L. G. 1, 10 (1921).
considerations of comity and full faith and credit in custody proceed-
ings in favor of a more exhaustive look into the welfare of the child
through "extra-litigious" 79 custody courts, i.e. family courts.
John R. Bozeran
75 See Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 44, § 88, at 286.
76 Ibid.
77See 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 970 (1933) on the effect of a custody decree in a
foreign state.
19 See Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 44, at 293, and see 73 Yale L.J. 1197
op. cit. supra note 53, at 1197.
